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This Article presents our first well-documented example of a 
self-conscious transitional justice policy—the classical Athenians’ 
response to atrocities committed during the reign of the Thirty 
Tyrants—as a case study that can offer insight into the design of 
modern transitional justice institutions.  The Athenians carefully 
balanced retribution and forgiveness:  an amnesty protected 
collaborators from direct prosecution, but in practice private 
citizens could indirectly sanction even low-level oligarchic 
sympathizers by raising their collaboration as character evidence in 
unrelated lawsuits.  They also balanced remembering and 
forgetting:  discussion of the civil war in the courts memorialized 
the atrocities committed during the tyranny but also whitewashed 
the widespread collaboration by ordinary citizens, depicting the 
majority of the populace as members of the democratic resistance.  
This case study of Athens’ successful reconciliation offers new 
insight into contemporary transitional justice debates.  The 
Athenian experience suggests that the current preoccupation with 
uncovering the truth may be misguided.  The Athenian case also 
counsels that providing an avenue for individual victims to pursue 
local grievances can help minimize the impunity gap created by 
the inevitably selective nature of transitional justice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most accounts of transitional justice institutions begin with the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following World War II.1
In 404 B.C.E., Athens experienced a civil war marked by 
horrific violence:  in an eight month-period, an oligarchic coup led 
by the “Thirty Tyrants” resulted in the killing of between five and 
ten percent of the citizenry as well as the expulsion, by some 
accounts, of more than half the population.
  But, of 
course, the challenge of moving on after civil war or mass atrocity 
is much older—as old as organized society itself.  The ancient 
Athenian democracy provides our first well-documented example 
of a self-conscious transitional justice policy.  This case study of 
Athens’ successful reconciliation following civil war offers new 
insight into several contemporary debates over the design of 
modern transitional justice institutions.  More specifically, the 
Athenian experience suggests that the current focus on uncovering 
the truth may be misguided.  The Athenian case also counsels that 
providing an avenue for individual victims to pursue local 
grievances can help minimize the impunity gap created by the 
inevitably selective nature of transitional justice. 
2
 
1 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 27 (1998) 
(“By the end of the twentieth century, politicians, leaders, and human rights 
activists cited these trials as landmark contributions to the struggles for a just 
world order.”). 
  The restored 
democracy arrived at a careful balance between retribution and 
forgiveness.  Formally, all but the top officials in the former regime 
were given amnesty, but in practice private citizens could 
2 For discussion on the number of Athenians killed, see ISOCRATES, 
Areopagiticus, in ISOCRATES I 182, 197 (David C. Mirhady & Yun Lee Too trans., 
Univ. of Tex. Press 2000) (discussing how the Thirty Tyrants executed fifteen 
hundred citizens without trial) [Isoc. 7.67]; AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon, in 
AESCHINES 159, 244 (Chris Carey trans., Univ. of Tex. Press 2000) [Aesch. 3.235]; 
ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, in ARISTOTLE AND XENOPHON ON DEMOCRACY 
AND OLIGARCHY 139, 178 (J.M. Moore trans., 1986) (showing that the Thirty 
embarked on a killing rampage, killing “no less than fifteen hundred men”) [Ar. 
Ath. Pol. 35.4]; BARRY S. STRAUSS, ATHENS AFTER THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 70–86 
(1986) (providing a figure for the lowest estimate of the male citizen population at 
14,000–16,250); JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 127 (1989) 
(estimating that the population range throughout the fourth century was 20,000-
30,000).  As for the expulsion, see DIODORUS OF SICILY, Book XIV, in DIODORUS OF 
SICILY VI 1, 23 (C. H. Oldfather trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1933) (stating that more 
than half the Athenian population was driven to flee by the murders and lawless 
actions of the Thirty) [Diodorus Diod. 14.5.7]; ISOCRATES, supra note 2, at 182, 197 
(declaring that over five thousand were expelled) [Isoc. 7.67].   
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indirectly sanction even low-level oligarchic sympathizers by 
raising their collaboration as character evidence in unrelated 
lawsuits.  The Athenians also balanced remembering and 
forgetting:  discussion of the civil war in the courts memorialized 
the atrocities committed during the tyranny but also whitewashed 
the widespread collaboration by ordinary citizens, depicting the 
majority of the populace as members of the democratic resistance.  
The Athenian reconciliation, which endured until Athens was 
defeated by Philip of Macedon, was admired throughout Greece 
for its success in avoiding the cycle of revolution and counter-
revolution that afflicted other Greek city-states in the classical 
period. 
This Article begins by examining why the Athenian 
reconciliation was so successful.  I argue that Athens’ unique legal 
culture permitted the amnesty to be implemented in a way that 
promoted unity while at the same time avoiding a sense of 
impunity at the local level.  There were three aspects to this.  First, 
in the generation following the war, speeches in the Athenian 
courts helped cultivate reconciliation by creating a unifying 
(though misleading) collective memory of the civil war that 
focused blame narrowly on the Thirty Tyrants, downplayed the 
extent of collaboration, and depicted the Amnesty not as a 
politically expedient compromise but as proof of the Athenians’ 
moderation and superior character.  Second, litigants’ collaboration 
or resistance during the tyranny was often raised as character 
evidence in unrelated lawsuits and in fitness examinations for 
public officials.  Athenian jury verdicts could turn on this evidence, 
and the very experience of being accused of collaboration before 
hundreds of jurors constituted a form of shaming punishment.  
These indirect sanctions minimized resentment at the local level by 
providing some limited accountability for crimes committed 
during the war, while also encouraging former collaborators to 
publicly pledge their allegiance to the democracy.  Finally, Athens’ 
civic institutions, including courts, required the regular, active 
participation of Athenian citizens.  These institutions helped repair 
individual social relationships by forcing former oligarchs and 
democratic rebels to work together productively. 
Can the Athenian experience tell us something about how we 
should respond to civil war and mass atrocity today?  Ancient 
Athens may seem too far removed from the modern cultural 
context to provide a useful comparison.  But those who study and 
design transitional justice institutions are already in the business of 
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trying to draw lessons from settings that are quite different from 
one another—from Latin America to Western Europe to South 
Africa to Rwanda to Cambodia.  In addition, scholars of 
transitional justice have tried to draw lessons from historical as 
well as contemporary transitions.3
Of course, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from a single 
case study.  We will see that the Athenians’ idiosyncratic attitude 
toward the rule of law precludes the direct adoption of the 
Athenian approach.  But we may be able to draw some mid-level 
observations from the Athenian case, observations that may be 
worth testing against other case studies in future transitional 
justice research while bearing in mind the design of contemporary 
transitional justice institutions. 
  Athens offers another case 
study—in some ways an exceptionally useful one, because we 
know that the Athenian reconciliation worked over the long term. 
First, the Athenian reconciliation demonstrates the importance 
of addressing reconciliation on the local level, both by providing 
an outlet for private resentments and by encouraging individuals 
on opposite sides of the conflict to work together.  Centralized 
institutions that focus exclusively on high-level offenders may not 
be as effective as schemes that permit individual victims to air 
complaints.  Such decentralized, victim-centered approaches can 
take many forms; recent transitional justice experiments that 
incorporate this feature include South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and Rwanda’s Gacaca courts.  Most 
controversially, the Athenian case casts some doubt on an 
assumption underlying the recent proliferation of truth 
commissions:  the cardinal value of uncovering the truth behind 
the violence.   
Section 1 introduces the paper while Section 2 briefly describes 
the reign of the Thirty Tyrants and the terms of the reconciliation 
agreement.  Sections 3 and 4 explore why the Athenian 
 
3 See generally JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004) (discussing several historical transitions, including 
Athens in 411 and 403 B.C. and France from 1814–1815); MINOW, supra note 1 
(including a variety of historical examples, including most prominently, post-
World War II Germany); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 27 (2000) (discussing 
a variety of transitions, including those in Germany, Argentina, Greece, Latin 
America, Central Europe, and Latin America); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 762, 771–77 (2004) 
(examining a wide range of historical transitions, including the American Civil 
War and the French Revolution). 
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reconciliation succeeded, tracing the decisive role played by the 
Athenian courts.  Section 5 discusses what we might learn from 
Athens’ successful response to mass atrocity. 
2. THE TERROR 
More Athenians were killed by the Thirty Tyrants in their nine-
month reign than were killed in ten years during the 
Peloponnesian War.4  What follows is a basic account of the 
violence, with a particular emphasis on what we can discern about 
the level of complicity of various elements of the population.  
Although there are discrepancies in the sources and many facts 
about the oligarchic period are still contested by historians,5
2.1.  Accession of the Thirty and Judicial Murder 
 
particularly the chronology of events, these debates are not 
relevant to our story and I will largely avoid them. 
The Athenian Assembly had little choice in the initial 
appointment of the Thirty.  The Athenians had been soundly 
defeated by the Spartans and were literally starving because of a 
Spartan blockade when they agreed to surrender, tear down their 
walls, and hand over most of their fleet.  Under pressure from the 
Spartan commander,6 the Assembly acceded to the local oligarchic 
faction and appointed thirty men to draft a constitution in 
accordance with the ancestral laws (patrioi nomoi).7
 
4 See XENOPHON, HELLENICA 157 (Carleton Brownson trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1918) (showing that the number of fatalities was less during the 
Peloponnesian War than during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.21]. 
  Once in power, 
5 See, e.g., PETER KRENTZ, THE THIRTY AT ATHENS 64–67 (1982) (highlighting 
competing theories regarding certain aspects of the reign of the Thirty); THOMAS 
CLARK LOENING, THE RECONCILIATION AGREEMENT OF 403/402 B.C. IN ATHENS 
(1987) (examining the reconciliation agreement in depth); MARTIN OSTWALD, FROM 
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW 460–90 (1986) (detailing the 
reign of the Thirty); ANDREW WOLPERT, REMEMBERING DEFEAT (2002) (analyzing the 
civil war and its aftermath); Edwin Carawan, Amnesty and Accountings for the 
Thirty, 56.1 CLASSICAL Q. 57, 57–76 (2006) (calling into question an interpretation of 
the nature of the accounting levied in the aftermath of the civil war). 
6 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS 113, 131 (S.C. Todd trans., Univ. of 
Tex. Press 2000) (revealing the Spartan Lysander’s threat to the lives of the 
assemblymen) [Lys. 12.71–75]; DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 14–17 (showing how 
Lysander ordered the appointment of the Thirty to head the state) [Diod. 14.3.2–
7]. 
7 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 116–19 (illustrating the first treacherous 
steps the oligarchy took with the consent of Lysander) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.11–14]. 
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the Thirty ignored the order to draft a constitution and instead 
appointed magistrates and a new Council of 500 from among their 
supporters.8  Even more ominous, they hired 300 “whip-bearing 
servants” to carry out their orders and intimidate the populace.9  
While it is not clear whether the Assembly decree appointing the 
Thirty authorized them to govern Athens temporarily until the 
new constitution was drafted,10
The Thirty immediately set to work eliminating their 
opponents.  Jury courts had been suspended during the war and 
were not revived by the Thirty.  Instead, the Thirty tried opponents 
before the Council of 500, which they packed with their own 
supporters.  This was judicial murder.  The trials appear to have 
been a farce:  they dispensed with the secret ballot, and often relied 
on evidence from informants coerced to testify under threat of 
death.
 there is no question that by 
refusing to issue a constitution and taking complete and indefinite 
control over the government, the Thirty crossed the line into illegal 
rule. 
11
The Thirty were seated on the dais.  Two tables were set out 
in front of them, and one had to cast one’s vote not into 
voting urns but openly on these tables, with the vote to 
convict going on the further table:  so how could any of 
  One description of a trial held soon after the Thirty rose to 
power against men who had opposed the peace treaty with Sparta 
recounts the intimidating atmosphere, as members of the Council 
publicly cast their votes in front of the Thirty. 
 
8 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 177 (stating that the Thirty disregarded the 
purpose for which they had been appointed and proceeded to use their 
appointment to wrest and maintain control of the city) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.1]; 
XENOPHON, supra note 4, 116–19 (detailing how the Thirty misused their office to 
further their own goals) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.11–14]. 
9 See ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, at 139, 177 (discussing 
how the hiring of such servants was part of the oligarchy’s plan to control the 
city) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.1]. 
10 The subject of politeusousi in Xenophon’s description of the Assembly 
decree is unclear, but may refer to the Thirty.  XENOPHON, supra note 4, 113–15 
[Xen. Hell. 2.3.2].  For discussion, see OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 477–78, n.70 
(attempting to determine the exact powers conferred on the Thirty); KRENTZ, supra 
note 5, at 50 (arguing that the Thirty were elected as a government and not simply 
as a legislative commission). 
11 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 147, 151–52 
(detailing the unfair mode by which the victims were put to death) [Lys. 13.36, 61–
62]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 122–23 (showing that the Thirty killed on account 
of personal enmity and expediency) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22]. 
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them [i.e., the defendants] be rescued?  In a word, the death 
penalty was passed on all who went to the Council-
chamber to face trial.12
At first, the Thirty executed only a small number of political 
opponents and “sycophants” (men known for bringing frivolous 
prosecutions).  Despite the procedural irregularity of these trials, 
both Xenophon and Aristotle’s the Constitution of the Athenians
 
13 
report that these actions were widely popular.14  Over time, the 
executions multiplied, and, with them, opposition to the regime:  
Xenophon describes the “great numbers continually—and 
unjustly—put to death,” causing “many to band together and 
wonder what the state was coming to.”15
2.2. The Creation of the 3000 and Widespread Extrajudicial Killings 
 
Theramenes, one of the Thirty, opposed the prosecutions, 
arguing that the terror tactics were alienating potential supporters 
and weakening the regime.  In response, the Thirty agreed to 
widen their base of support slightly by drawing up a list of 3000 
citizens who would participate in the government, 
disenfranchising the remaining three-quarters of the population.16
 
12 LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 147, 151–52 [Lys. 
13.36, 61–62]. 
  
To the extent we can discern the motivations of the Thirty, they 
appear to have wanted to establish a society along the Spartan 
model, in which a narrow group of elite homoioi would exercise 
citizenship rights, relegating the rest of the population to a second-
13 The Constitution of the Athenians was not an enacted constitution, but a 
partial history and description of Athenian political and legal institutions 
probably written by Aristotle or his students.  See ADRIAAN LANNI, LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF CLASSICAL ATHENS 6 (2006). 
14 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 118–19 (showing that citizens who were not 
under threat of guilt were pleased with the first condemnatory and punitive steps 
of the Thirty) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.12]; ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, 
at 139, 178 (describing the initial delight of the populace with the actions of the 
Thirty that they deemed to be motivated by noble intentions) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.3]. 
15 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 122–23 (showing Theramenes’ musings on 
whether the state was being led in a good direction) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22]. 
16 See ARISTOTLE, The Constitution of Athens, supra note 2, at 139, 178 
(describing the circumstances leading to the list of 3000 as well as Theramenes’ 
criticisms of the creation of the list) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.1–2]; see also XENOPHON, supra 
note 4, at 121–23 (describing the creation of the 3000 as a response to Theramenes’ 
concerns about the disempowerment of the citizens under the oligarchy) [Xen. 
Hell. 2.3.18–22]. 
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class status.17  The 3000 appear to have been handpicked by the 
Thirty.18  In practice, the 3000 did not play an active role in the 
government; we know of only one meeting of the full 3000 and one 
other meeting involving all hoplites and cavalry on the list, both of 
which were held after the democratic opposition had gained the 
upper hand and the Thirty was on the defensive.19
The consequences of exclusion from the list of 3000 went 
beyond the humiliation of formal disenfranchisement.  The Thirty 
announced that anyone not in the 3000 could be killed by the 
Thirty without trial, while members of the 3000 had a right to a 
trial before the Council.
 
20  Not long after the list of 3000 was 
published, the Thirty collected the arms of the disenfranchised and 
began a brutal killing spree.21  Xenophon suggests that many of the 
murders were motivated by personal enmity or a desire to 
confiscate property rather than because of political opposition.22
 
17 See, e.g., KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 64–67 (stating that the Thirty attempted to 
reform Athens using a “model of idealized Sparta” and comparing the structural 
hierarchy of the Thirty and the 3000 with the structures of Sparta’s government); 
see also OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 485–87 (analyzing the adoption of portions of the 
Spartan system by the Thirty and comparing and contrasting the 3000 with the 
Spartan homoioi and hoplite class); David Whitehead, Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants, 
in 13/14 ANCIENT SOCIETY 106, 106–30 (1982–83) (discussing the reasons why the 
Thirty sought to remodel Athenian society as Sparta). 
  
The Thirty’s decision to kill a number of metics (resident aliens) at 
18 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (describing the arbitrary factors used by 
the Thirty to select the list of 3000 and the secrecy surrounding the list and its 
revisions prior to its delayed publication) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.2]. 
19 See, e.g., XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 148–49, 156–59 (discussing the limited, 
inconsistent participation of the 3000 in the violence and the minor role of the 
3000 during the deposition of the Thirty) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9, 2.4.23]; ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 2, at 179 (describing the marginal role of the 3000 within the violent rule of 
the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.1]. 
20 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (suggesting that the additional 
protection granted to the 3000 was minimal and arguing that the list of 3000 did 
not create a significant obstacle to the Thirty’s attempts to rid themselves of 
opposition) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 36.1]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 120–21, 139–41 
(describing how the Thirty simply struck Theramenes’ name from the list of 3000 
when it became apparent that the Council would not vote to condemn 
Theramenes and executed him without the vote) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.18, 2.3.50–51]. 
21 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 179 (detailing the disarmament of the 
general population and the continuing violence of the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 37.2]; 
see also XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (describing the growing confidence of the 
Thirty and the expanding scope of their actions) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.1]. 
22 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that the Thirty “put many 
people to death out of personal enmity, and many also for the sake of securing 
their property.”) [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–21]. 
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one point was attributed to several different motivations:  
xenophobia, elimination of the political opposition, and the desire 
to confiscate property.23  Isocrates claims that the number of people 
executed without trial by the Thirty over these three months was 
more than the number of subjects the Athenians put on trial during 
the entire period of its empire.24
2.3. Informers and Citizens’ Arrests 
 
In addition to acquiescing to the senseless violence, ordinary 
citizens sometimes served as informers or assisted in arrests.  
However rigged they may have been, trials before the Council still 
required some showing of evidence; this evidence could be 
provided by willing or unwilling informers.  The trial of one such 
informer after the restoration of the democracy survives.25  
Predictably, the defendant seems to have made the assertion that 
he only testified because he was under duress, but the prosecution 
argues that the defendant was a willing informant, pointing out 
that the defendant had a chance to escape and refuse to become an 
informant by fleeing Athens but did not take it.26  Interestingly, the 
prosecutor’s narrative reveals that informers were often subject to 
considerable pressure.  The prosecutor recounts how another man, 
Menestratus, became an informer only after he was arrested on a 
capital charge so that he could gain immunity; the prosecutor 
praises the heroism of one Aristophanes who refused to become an 
informant and was executed as a result; and the prosecutor’s case 
is predicated on the notion that the defendant would have had to 
go into voluntary exile to avoid serving as an informer.27
 
23 Xenophon (2.3.20-22) and Lysias (12.6) attribute the Thirty’s actions to 
greed.  XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 123 [Xen. Hell. 2.3.20–22]; LYSIAS, Against 
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS supra note 6, at 113, 116–17 [Lys. 12.4].  Others dismiss the 
arguments attributing the murders to greed and fear and suggest that the Thirty 
ordered the killings to suppress political opposition.  See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 
80–82.  Xenophobia is also presented as a possible motivation for the Thirty’s 
action against the metics.  See OSTWALD, supra note 5, at 487. 
 
24 See ISOCRATES, Panegyricus, in ISOCRATES II 23, 55–56 (Terry L. Papillon 
trans., 2004) [Isoc. 4.113]. 
25 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 140–60 (prosecuting 
Agoratus for his actions as an informer) [Lys. 13]. 
26 See id. at 146, 149–50 (stating that Agoratus could have left instead of 
becoming an informant but chose to stay because he believed he would be 
rewarded for being an informant) [Lys. 13.31, 52]. 
27 See id. at 149–52 (arguing that Agoratus was guilty of the same crimes as 
Menestratus and therefore should be punished with the same sentence as 
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The guilt of citizens who actually carried out arrests and turned 
individuals over to the Thirty is murkier.  In Plato’s Apology, 
Socrates recounts how the Thirty ordered him and four others to 
arrest Leon of Salamis so that he could be put to death.  According 
to Socrates, the Thirty “often ordered many others to do such 
things, since they wanted to implicate as many others in their 
causes.”28  While the four others arrested Leon, Socrates simply 
went home, neither taking part in the arrest nor trying to save or 
warn Leon.  Socrates was not punished for his disobedience.  
Perhaps, as Socrates claims, the Thirty would have killed him in 
retaliation if the regime had not been close to collapse.  Perhaps 
Socrates’ special stature and association with Critias, his former 
student and a leader of the Thirty, saved him.  Or perhaps the 
failure to carry out an arrest was less likely to provoke retaliation 
from the tyrants than other offenses.  One source suggests that 
some citizens took revenge on personal enemies by initiating 
summary arrests during the killing spree.29  After the restoration of 
the democracy, court speakers would at times declare their clean 
record during the oligarchy by stating that in addition to not being 
members of the Council or officers under the Thirty, they also did 
not carry out any arrests.30
 
Menestratus and suggesting that Agoratus should be responsible for his choice 
because others such as Aristophanes did not make the same decision under 
similar circumstances) [Lys. 13.52–61]. 
  This suggests that citizen arrests were 
common, were regarded as particularly blameworthy, or both.  It is 
interesting that speakers generally do not state that they did not 
serve as informers; while having been an informer may have been 
considered morally blameworthy, informers do not appear to have 
been considered part of the oligarchy in the same way that those 
who carried out arrests were.  It seems that while it was 
understood that many informers testified under the true threat of 
death, there was a suspicion that at least some of the citizens who 
28 PLATO, Apology of Socrates, in THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SOCRATES 57 
(Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith eds., 2002) [Pl. Apol. 32c-d]. 
29 See LYSIAS, For the Soldier, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 95, 96–100 (detailing a 
soldier’s argument that he was being accused for nothing more than enmity) [Lys. 
9]. 
30 See id. at 98–99 (demonstrating that the lack of participation in public office 
could be used as evidence supporting innocence) [Lys. 9.13–17]; see, e.g., LYSIAS, 
On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 260, 265 
(defending against allegations of oligarchic sympathies by stating that “during the 
oligarchy nobody suffered summary arrest at my hands, none of my enemies was 
punished, and none of my friends was rewarded”) [Lys. 25.15]. 
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carried out arrests initiated the action themselves or could have 
avoided carrying out the Thirty’s orders. 
2.4. Involuntary Exile, Massacre at Eleusis, and the Rise of the 
Democratic Opposition 
At some point after the extra-judicial murders of those 
excluded from the 3000, the Thirty took the additional step of 
banning everyone excluded from the 3000 from the urban center 
and confiscating their property.31  Most of the displaced 
individuals settled in the Piraeus, the port and commercial center 
of Athens; some may have gone into exile.32
By this point, an opposition force made up of a small number 
of citizens and a larger group of mercenaries and resident aliens 
had formed.
 
33  When the resistance won a number of victories, the 
Thirty became nervous and decided to take the village of Eleusis, a 
town within Athens’ territory, as a possible refuge.  Xenophon 
describes in detail how the Thirty murdered the male inhabitants 
in order to take control over the town.34  The cavalry ordered a 
mandatory registration of male Eleusinians under the pretense of 
determining how large a garrison to leave in the town.35  After 
each man registered, he was ordered to walk out the city gate, 
where each was arrested and brought to Athens.36
On the following day they summoned to the Odeum the 
hoplites who were on the roll and the cavalry also.  Then 
  Xenophon 
continues: 
 
31 See LYSIAS, On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 
6, at 260, 267 (recounting the expulsion of other citizens from the town) [Lys. 
25.22]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (describing the evictions mandated by the 
Thirty as one of the expansions of the Thirty’s power after the death of 
Theramenes) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.1]. 
32 See WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing how those not enrolled in the 
Three Thousand, fled to Piraeus to escape the tyranny of the Thirty).  Compare 
DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 103–05 (stating that the Thirty transferred citizens with 
no political rights to Piraeus while others were exiled) [Diod. 14.32.4] with 
XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 145 (noting that the exiled fled to Piraeus) [Xen. Hell. 
2.4.1]. 
33 See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 83–84 (detailing the composition of the men at 
Phyle: about 100 were Athenians, 300 were mercenaries, and 300 were foreigners). 
34 For a detailed description of the Thirty’s strategy to take control of Eleusis, 
see XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 147–49 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10]. 
35 Id. at 147 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8]. 
36 Id. at 147–49 [Xen. Hell. 2.4.8–10]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
LANNI.DOC 1/13/2011  6:45 PM 
562 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
Critias [one of the Thirty] rose and said:  “We, gentlemen,” . 
. . “are establishing this government no less for you than for 
ourselves.  Therefore, even as you will share in honours, so 
also you must share in the dangers.  Therefore you must 
vote the condemnation of the Eleusinians who have been 
seized, that you may have the same hopes and fears as 
we.”37
Those present were then instructed to vote in the open, in the 
presence of both the Thirty and the armed Spartan guards who had 
been requested to help the oligarchy keep control of Athens.
 
38  
Nearly the entire male population of Eleusis was executed in this 
manner.  The Thirty also massacred the inhabitants of Salamis, 
though our sources do not report how the murders were carried 
out or whether a similar vote was arranged.39
When the opposition forces approached the Piraeus, many of 
the citizens excluded from the city, as well as metics, foreigners, 
and even slaves joined the fight.
 
40  The rebels routed the Thirty in 
Piraeus, killing two of their leaders, including Critias.  Following 
this defeat, the 3000 met in Athens and voted to replace the Thirty 
with a board of Ten; the deposed members of the Thirty settled in 
Eleusis.41
 
37 XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 149 (footnotes omitted) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9]. 
  As the opposition grew in strength and threatened to 
38 Xenophon and Aristotle offer very different accounts of when the Spartan 
garrison was called in.  According to Xenophon (2.3.14) they were called in very 
early in the reign of the Thirty, while Aristotle (37.2) states that they did not arrive 
until much later, after the Thirty was seriously threatened.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 
2, at 179 [Ar. Ath. Pol. 37.2]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 119 [Xen. Hell. 2.3.14]. 
39 See, e.g., DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 103–05 (stating that the Thirty killed the 
Eleusians and Salaminians for siding with the exiles) [Diod. 14.32.4]; see also 
LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148 (discussing the 
massacres in Salamis and Eleusis generally) [Lys. 13.44]; LYSIAS, Against 
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 126 (describing how three hundred 
citizens in Salamis and Eleusis were condemned to death “by a collective vote”) 
[Lys. 12.52]. 
40 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180–82 (discussing how opposing forces 
gained strength as all Greeks joined their side) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.3, 40.2]; DIODORUS, 
supra note 2, at 107 (explaining that exiles from around all of Greece flocked to the 
Piraeus “to lay siege to the city”) [Diod. 14.33.4]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 159 
(noting the diversity of men among the opposition forces) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.25]. 
41 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 179 (“The men from the city returned after 
the battle, met in the Agora the next day, and deposed the Thirty and elected ten 
citizens with full powers to bring the war to an end.”) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 38.1]; 
XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 157–59 (describing the process which led to the 
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attack the city, the oligarchic leaders in the city asked Sparta to 
send reinforcements.42  The Spartans at first blockaded the Piraeus, 
but then changed strategy and the Spartan commander Pausanias 
negotiated a reconciliation agreement under which the democracy 
was restored.43
2.5. Forms of Collaboration 
 
What were the crimes committed under the Thirty and who 
committed them?  Between September 404 and May 403 the Thirty 
Tyrants executed approximately 1500 Athenians and drove out of 
the city and confiscated the property of thousands more.44  Those 
bearing the most guilt for this violence were, of course, the senior 
public officials: the Thirty themselves, plus the so-called Eleven, 
who were the magistrates charged with carrying out executions.  
However, responsibility was widespread, in part because of the 
Thirty’s deliberate strategy of implicating others.45
 
deposition of the Thirty and the election of the ten, which consisted of one 
member from each of the ten tribes) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.23–24]. 
  Members of the 
Council sent countless innocents to their deaths.  Some citizens 
gave testimony that led to executions, often to save their own lives.  
Other citizens arrested men and handed them over to the Eleven to 
be killed without trial.  Some of these citizens made these arrests 
under threat of death and some made them on their own initiative.  
42 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 161 (detailing this request for assistance and 
explaining Lysander’s plan to blockade the men in Piraeus by land and by sea in 
order to induce a rapid surrender) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.28]. 
43 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 161–71 (discussing the circumstances 
ultimately leading to Pausanias’ change in strategy to restore democracy in 
Athens) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.28–43]. 
44 See AESCHINES, Against Ctesiphon, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 159, 244 
(noting that more than fifteen hundred citizens were killed without trial) [Aesch. 
3.235]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 178 (detailing the widespread attacks on the 
citizenry which resulted in more than fifteen hundred deaths) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 35.4]; 
DIODORUS, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that in addition to executing ordinary 
citizens, the Thirty also killed wealthy citizens for their property and 
appropriated the property of citizens who fled to protect themselves) [Diod. 
14.5.6]; see also ISOCRATES, Areopagiticus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 182, 197 
(contrasting the restraint of the exiles with the extensive violence of the Thirty) 
[Isoc. 7.67]. 
45 See, e.g., PLATO, supra note 28, at 57 (“[W]hen the oligarchy came to power, 
the Thirty summoned me and four others to the Rotunda and ordered us to bring 
Leon from Salamis to be put to death.”) [Pl. Apol. 32c]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 
149 (describing how the Thirty forced the hoplites and cavalry of Eleusis to 
condemn to death certain male Eleusian citizens so that they “may have the same 
hopes and fears as [them]”) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.9]. 
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The cavalry arrested the men of Eleusis, and the entire armed 
forces voted to condemn them. More broadly, much of the 
population stayed in the city and did not object during the unjust 
judicial murders and massacres of hundreds of citizens without 
trial.  The overall picture is one of widespread collaboration, or at 
least acquiescence, by the citizenry in mass violence orchestrated 
by a small but highly intimidating leadership. 
3. “RECONCILIATION” 
The Athenians remembered the reconciliation agreement as a 
complete success,46 an act of generosity and unity that set Athens 
apart from other city-states.47  One orator told the Athenian jury, 
“the whole of Greece regards you as very generous and sensible 
men, because you didn’t devote yourselves to revenge for the past, 
but to the preservation of the city and the unity of its citizens.”48
 
46 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES 99, 137–38 
(Michael Gagarin & Douglas M. MacDowell trans., 1998) (showing that the 
Athenian reconciliation was regarded as a “satisfactory settlement of mutual 
disagreements”) [Andoc. 1.140]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 182 (discussing how 
well the Athenians managed their affairs post-reconciliation) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 40.3]; 
ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 104 
(arguing that Athens exhibited a superior intelligence in handling post-war civil 
strife) [Isoc. 18.31–32]; XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (recognizing that the 
Athenians chose not to remember past grievances) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. 
  
The reconciliation agreement was successful in the sense that 
Athens avoided the widespread bloodshed that often accompanied 
civil wars in other Greek states and established a stable democracy 
that endured for the remainder of Athens’ history as an 
independent state.  But while Athenians on opposite sides of the 
conflict found a way to live and govern together in the restored 
democracy, our sources reveal that private, human resentment 
over actions taken during the oligarchy remained strong for 
decades after the end of the civil war. 
47 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137–38 (reaffirming the attitude of generosity and sensibility exhibited by 
the Athenians following the reconciliation) [Andoc. 1.140]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea 
Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 104 (arguing that Athens 
exhibited a superior intelligence in handling post-war civil strife) [Isoc. 18.31–32.]. 
48 ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 
99, 137 [Andoc. 1.140]. 
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3.1. The Terms of the Reconciliation Agreement 
The terms of the reconciliation agreement were less a product 
of generosity than of military necessity.  Although the democrats 
had gained the upper hand at the time of the settlement, the arrival 
of Spartan forces to bolster the oligarchs threatened the democrats’ 
success.49
The highest officials of the oligarchy—the Thirty, the Ten who 
succeeded the Thirty, the Eleven who carried out executions, and 
the governors of the Piraeus—were given the option of forfeiting 
their Athenian citizenship to live autonomously in the village of 
Eleusis with any of their supporters who wished to join them.
  Pausanias, the Spartan commander, presided over an 
agreement that guaranteed the restoration of the democracy but 
also treated the oligarchs and their supporters with relative 
leniency. 
50  
Remarkably, the agreement not only gave the former oligarchs 
control over the village whose men they had massacred; it also 
forced current inhabitants of Eleusis to sell their land if one of the 
settlers wished to buy it.51  This experiment in splitting Athens into 
two autonomous settlements was short-lived:  when the Athenians 
learned two years later that the former oligarchs were hiring 
mercenaries, the Athenians killed the opposing generals and 
reintegrated Eleusis into a single Athenian state.52
The top oligarchic officials who did not want to relocate to 
Eleusis were permitted to remain in Athens provided they 
underwent an euthuna, a trial-like accounting of their conduct in 
office, and accepted any punishment meted out by the court.
 
53
 
49 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (noting the difficulty caused by the 
Spartan troops prior to the eventual success of the agreement) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. 
  The 
accounting was not an extraordinary transitional justice institution 
but the standard procedure faced by all outgoing officials under 
the democracy both before and after the revolution.  The only 
adjustment made to the procedure was that the oligarchs were to 
50 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180–81 (discussing the conditions 
surrounding the option to move to Eleusis) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39–40.1]. 
51 See id. (relaying how land was transferred between settlers) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 
39.3]. 
52 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (showing that the strategic hiring of 
mercenaries by the oligarchs elicited a definitive response from the Athenians) 
[Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]. 
53 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (discussing how members of the Thirty 
and the Eleven and the ten governors of Peiraeus would be “immune from 
prosecution once they had submitted to the euthuna”) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]. 
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be judged not by a jury drawn from all adult male citizens but 
from citizens with taxable property,54 a form, as one scholar has 
put it, of “loser’s justice.”55  The procedure appears to have been as 
even-handed in practice as advertised:  at least one member of the 
Thirty appears to have consented to, and passed, an accounting,56 
and the Constitution of the Athenians tells us that several of members 
of the Board of Ten who ruled at the end of the oligarchy passed 
their accountings.57
Everyone below the top officials was granted amnesty under 
the agreement.
 
58  The Assembly swore an oath, me mnesikakein, 
which is sometimes translated as “not to remember past wrongs,” 
but is more accurately (though less literally) translated as “not to 
bear a grudge” or “to cancel past grievances.”59
 
54 See id. (noting that the jury for the euthuna of the governors of Piraeus were 
the citizens of Piraeus and the jury for the euthuna of the others who held office in 
the city was limited to  citizens with taxable property ) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]. 
  The amnesty 
banned physical retaliation and lawsuits against those who 
committed crimes during the oligarchy.  Each year, the Council 
swore not to accept summary arrests that violated the amnesty, 
55 ELSTER, supra note 3, at 22. 
56 See LYSIAS, Against Theomnestus for Defamation, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 
101, 110 (stating that someone brought a homicide charge against one or more 
members of the Thirty in the year 399/398, which suggests that at least one 
oligarch passed his accounting and remained in Athens) [Lys. 10.31]; see also 
KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 122 (explaining that one scholar has argued that the 
passages in Against Eratosthenes suggest that there was more than one defendant 
at this accounting, however, as Krentz points out, “the plural references can be 
understood as Lysias’ attempt to condemn by association”); LYSIAS, Against 
Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 115 (noting the prosecution speech at 
the accounting of another member of the Thirty, Eratosthenes, survives although 
the specific outcome of the accounting is unknown) [Lys. 12]. 
57 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 180 (explaining how Rhinon and his friends, 
members of the Board of Ten, passed their accounting under the democracy) [Ar. 
Ath. Pol. 38.4]. 
58 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137–38 (reiterating positive attitudes toward the reconciliation, as well as 
the fact that all collaborators below the Thirty and the Eleven were granted total 
amnesty) [Andoc. 1.140]; ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (recognizing that 
complete amnesty was given to everyone except the Thirty) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]. 
59 See EDWIN CARAWAN, RHETORIC AND THE LAW OF DRACO 130–31 (1998) 
(examining the use of the phrase in other Greek treaties and agreements); see also 
NICOLE LORAUX, THE DIVIDED CITY: ON MEMORY AND FORGETTING IN ANCIENT 
ATHENS 149–52 (2002) (interpreting me mnesikakein); David Cohen, The Rhetoric of 
Justice: Strategies of Reconciliation and Revenge in the Restoration of Athenian 
Democracy in 403 BC, 42 EUR. J. SOC. 335, 339 (2001) (noting that one of the possible 
translations of me mnesikakein is “not to hold a grudge”). 
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and jurors similarly swore to uphold the law and not to bear a 
grudge for events under the Thirty.60  The Amnesty had one 
exception:  charges of homicide and wounding for actions taken 
during the oligarchy could proceed provided that the defendant 
killed or wounded “with his own hand” (autocheir).61  But this 
exception, probably included for reasons of religious pollution, 
had little practical effect.  Nearly all of those responsible for 
criminal violence committed during the civil war were shielded by 
the Amnesty because the actual executions were committed by the 
Board of Eleven, who were excluded from the Amnesty and all of 
whom, presumably, fled to Eleusis or into exile after the 
reconciliation.  After the reintegration of Eleusis in 401/400, the 
Amnesty was reaffirmed62 to make clear that the terms of the 
Amnesty extended to those who had relocated to Eleusis.63
3.2. Implementation and Resistance 
 
Aside from returning the land that had been confiscated,64
 
60 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 125 (describing the oath taken to grant amnesty for conduct which 
occurred under the Thirty, and to permit the Thirty and the Eleven, the main 
perpetrators, to remain in Athens, if they submitted to, and passed, an 
examination of their conduct in office) [Andoc. 1.90–91]. 
 the 
reconciliation agreement offered little to those who had been 
61 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181 (noting the lack of amnesty given to 
those who had killed another person with their own hands) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.5–6]. 
62 See id. (showing that the Amnesty was in effect prior to the fall of Eleusis) 
[Ar. Ath. Pol. 39.6]; see also ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND 
ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 125 (supporting the conception that the Amnesty 
was part of the reconciliation and that it was reaffirmed after the fall of Eleusis) 
[Andoc. 1.90–91].  But see XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (presenting a narrative 
that supports the idea that the Amnesty was only instituted after the fall of 
Eleusis) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43].  See generally LOENING, supra note 5, at 26–28 
(discussing this reconciliation debate in greater detail). 
63 See KRENTZ, supra note 5, at 122 (arguing that those in Eleusis excluded 
from the Amnesty went into voluntary exile); LOENING, supra note 5, at 116–17 
(noting that those in Eleusis who were excluded from the Amnesty, such as the 
Thirty and the Eleven, presumably went into voluntary exile to escape 
punishment).  We are not aware of any member of the Thirty or the Eleven 
returning to Athens after the fall of Eleusis. 
64 See LYSIAS, Against Hippotherses, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 366, 368 
(describing the complex rules in place under the reconciliation agreement 
surrounding the return of confiscated real property as well as movables and 
suggesting that payment would often have to be made for the recuperation of 
confiscated property) [Lys. 7]; see also LOENING, supra note 5, at 51–52 (discussing 
this property compensation process). 
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victimized by the Thirty.  Not surprisingly, some Athenians 
resisted complying with the Amnesty.  We are told of at least one 
former informant who, though covered by the Amnesty, opted to 
go into exile out of fear of retaliation.65  And we hear of one man 
who immediately violated the Amnesty, probably by taking 
physical vengeance,66 prompting one of Athens’ leaders to make an 
example of him by having the Council execute him without trial.67  
Aristotle suggests that this measure successfully deterred those 
intent on private vengeance.68  Attempts to bring private suits in 
violation of the Amnesty prompted the Athenians to create a new 
procedure, the paragraphe, which allowed a defendant to challenge 
the legality of a prosecution and imposed a financial penalty on the 
prosecutor if the case was thrown out.69  And we know of a few 
attempts, at least one of which appears to have been successful,70 to 
use creative legal arguments to get around the Amnesty and hold 
informants responsible for judicial murders committed under the 
Thirty.71  But despite some resistance, it appears that the Amnesty 
was generally honored in the sense that there appears to have been 
very little violent retaliation and very few prosecutions brought for 
the thousands of confiscations, murders, and other crimes 
committed under the Thirty.72
 
65 See LYSIAS, Against Andocides, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 61, 74 (comparing 
Andocides to an informer under the Thirty who may have been tracked down and 
killed by his enemies in Athens) [Lys. 6.45]. 
 
66 See CARAWAN, supra note 59, at 130–31 (discussing an example where 
Archinus arrested an unnamed citizen who violated the Amnesty and had him 
put to death without trial). 
67 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 181–82 (stating that Archinus stopped some 
of the returning democrats from killing their enemies) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 40.2].  Nepos 
also states that Thrasybulus stopped some of the returning democrats from killing 
their enemies.  See CORNELIUS NEPOS, Thrasybulus, in CORNELIUS NEPOS 92, 99 (John 
C. Rolfe trans., 1984) [Thrasyb. 3.3]. 
68 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 182 (suggesting that the execution examples 
prevented Athenians from taking both private and public revenge) [Ar. Ath. Pol. 
40.2–3]. 
69 See ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, 
at 97, 97–98 (describing the introduction of the paragraphe as a measure to stop 
prosecutions that violated the Amnesty) [Isoc. 18.2–3]. 
70 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 150–51 (stating 
that the informer, Menestratus, was tried and condemned) [Lys. 13.55–57]. 
71 See id. at 150 (describing the successful prosecution of  of Menestratus for 
being an informer) [Lys. 13.55–57]. 
72 See XENOPHON, supra note 4, at 171 (stating that the demos abided by its 
oaths) [Xen. Hell. 2.4.43]; see also ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND 
ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 125–26 (stating that Meletus had immunity for his 
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But was it that easy?  Very seldom, and never before and after 
in the ancient world, has a bloodletting so great been followed by 
an amnesty so generous.  What is striking about the amnesty is that 
the Athenians stuck to it long after the Spartan threat receded and 
despite the fact that many victims of the Thirty harbored 
resentment decades later.73
4. THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN RECONCILIATION 
  How did this happen? 
In this section, I explore how Athenian legal institutions 
fostered reconciliation and a peaceful transition to democracy.  I 
argue that Athens’ unique legal and political culture permitted the 
terms of the reconciliation agreement to be implemented in a way 
that promoted unity and social solidarity while it also recognized 
the need to avoid impunity for collaborators at the local or private 
level.74  First, in the generation following the war, speeches made 
in the Athenian courts helped cultivate reconciliation by creating a 
collective memory of the “misfortunes”75 that downplayed the 
extent of collaboration and extolled Athens for the generosity 
embodied in the Amnesty.76
 
arrest of Leon of Salamis due to the reconciliation) [Andoc. 1.94]; ISOCRATES, 
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 97, 102-03 (citing a 
case in which the defendant presented no defense other than immunity, based on 
the Amnesty, and was acquitted, and describing how two powerful individuals 
refrained from bringing suit to recover money lost during the oligarchy because of 
the amnesty) [Isoc. 18.22–23]. 
  Second, through the use of character 
evidence in unrelated cases and challenges to incoming officials, 
the Athenian courts provided some measure of individualized 
accountability at the private level, while also encouraging former 
73 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 277 (challenging 
a candidate to the archonship by referring to his conduct during the oligarchy) 
[Lys. 26.13–15]. 
74 In this way, Athenian transitional justice mechanisms were not 
epiphenomena but instead contributed to the success of the reconciliation.  See 
TEITEL, supra note 2, at 3–9 (arguing against the view that “[j]ustice seeking in 
[modern transitional] periods is fully epiphenomenal and best explained in terms 
of the balance of power”); see also Posner and Vermeule, supra note 3, at 770–77 
(providing modern examples of transitional justice mechanisms “as causal factors 
that may contribute to or undermine the success of a transition”). 
75 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137 (referring to the civil war obliquely as “the misfortunes”) [Andoc. 
1.140]. 
76 Excellent discussions of how Athenian court rhetoric constructed a 
collective memory of the civil war include WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 75–99 and 
Cohen, supra note 59. 
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collaborators to make a public proclamation of their allegiance to 
the democracy.  Finally, the highly participatory nature of 
Athenian civic institutions—not just courts, but also polis-wide 
and local deliberative assemblies—helped repair local relationships 
by forcing individuals on opposite sides of the conflict to work 
closely together. 
A few words of background on the Athenian court system may 
be helpful here.77  There were no lawyers or professional judges in 
ancient Athens; with few exceptions, litigants were required to 
deliver their own speeches to the jury.78
Litigants regularly introduced evidence—such as character 
evidence relating to the litigant’s military service or how he treated 
his parents—that modern courts would deem irrelevant and/or 
prejudicial.
  Each Athenian litigant 
was allotted a fixed amount of time to present his case.  Although a 
magistrate chosen by lot presided over each popular court, the 
magistrate did not interrupt the speaker for any reason or permit 
others to raise legal objections.  The magistrate did not even 
instruct the jury as to the laws relevant to the case.  Cases in the 
popular courts were heard by juries of adult male citizens chosen 
by lot and generally ranged from 201 to 501 in size.  A simple 
majority vote of the jury, taken without deliberation, determined 
the outcome of the trial.  No reasons for the verdict were given, 
and there was no provision for appeal. 
79  Evidence of a litigant’s collaboration or resistance 
during the civil war could influence jury verdicts in part because 
Athenian jurors did not feel constrained to strictly apply the statute 
under which a case was brought.80
 
77 See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 31–40 (outlining the structure of the 
Athenian legal system). 
  The treatment of law in the 
surviving speeches is consistent with Aristotle’s characterization of 
78 A litigant could donate some of his time to another speaker.  For an in-
depth study of the use of supporting speakers in Athenian courts, see LENE 
RUBINSTEIN, LITIGATION AND COOPERATION: SUPPORTING SPEAKERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CLASSICAL ATHENS (2000). 
79 See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (discussing extra-legal 
arguments brought up in Athenian courts). 
80 For a more detailed discussion, see generally id.  Although others have 
reached a similar conclusion, for example MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS 
ATHENIAN 193–224 (1998) (“The laws are a splendid thing; but a man who looks 
too closely to the laws is clearly a sykophant [sic].”) (quoting Menander).  Some 
disagree.  See, e.g., P.J. Rhodes, Keeping to the Point, in THE LAW AND THE COURTS IN 
ANCIENT GREECE 137 (Edward M. Harris & Lene Rubinstein eds., 2004) (arguing 
for a more qualified notion of relevance in Athenian litigation). 
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laws as a form of evidence, similar to contracts and witness 
testimony, rather than as a decisive guide to a verdict.81  The 
Athenian laws were inscribed on stone stelai in various public areas 
of Athens.  Litigants were responsible for finding and quoting any 
laws they thought helped their case, though there was no 
obligation to explain the relevant laws.  Rather than focusing on 
the elements of the particular charge at issue and applying them to 
the facts of the case, Athenian litigants would sometimes cite an 
array of laws that did not govern the charges in the case,82 and on 
occasion would not consider it relevant to discuss—or even 
mention—the law under which the suit was brought.83
Before discussing the three mechanisms through which the 
courts fostered reconciliation in more detail, I would like to 
emphasize one broader point:  the Athenian legal system was able 
to perform these functions without any significant change in its 
culture or design—a continuity that gave it a distinct advantage 
over modern institutions charged with dispensing transitional 
justice.  The broad notion of relevance and the contextualized 
  In many 
cases, the primary purpose of the relevant law may have been to 
set out a procedure for bringing a case to court.  The jury then 
attempted to arrive at a just outcome for the broadly defined 
dispute. 
 
81 See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 102 (George A. 
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing five items—laws, witnesses, 
contracts, tortures and oaths—that factor into judicial rhetoric) [Ar. Rhet. 1.15]. 
82 Speakers sometimes cited laws to bolster their portrayal of the character of 
the parties.  See, e.g., Michael de Brauw, “Listen to the Law Themselves”: Citations of 
Laws and Portrayal of Character in Attic Oratory, 97.2 CLASSICAL J. 161 (2001–2002) 
(exploring the citation of law in Athens as a means to portray character).  Speakers 
also cited the law to give the general impression that the laws supported their 
position.  See, e.g., C. Carey, Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory, 116 J. HELLENIC 
STUD. 33, 34 (1996) (arguing that litigants sometimes cite multiple law of 
questionable relevance “to overwhelm the jury with a seemingly compelling array 
of legal support”).  Ford provides a case study of the use of law in Aeschines’ 
Against Timarchus.  He notes that the discussion of the law at issue, which 
accounts for only one-sixth of the speech (1.28–32), is surrounded by a number of 
laws irrelevant to the charge but useful in constructing an image of the education 
and moral character of a proper orator that can be contrasted with the record and 
character of the speaker’s opponent.  Andrew Ford, Reading Homer from the 
Rostrum: Poems and Laws in Aeschines’ Against Timarchus, in PERFORMANCE 
CULTURE AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 231, 241 (Simon Goldhill & Robin Osborne 
eds., 1999). 
83 See, e.g., LYSIAS, Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 296 (omitting 
any citation to a law) [Lys. 30]. 
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approach to adjudication characteristic of Athenian courts84 made 
them a more effective forum for the creation of collective memory 
than modern war crimes tribunals.  In modern tribunals, the desire 
of prosecutors or judges to use the trial to create a shared 
understanding of the causes of ‘administrative massacres’—
atrocities perpetrated with the assistance of the modern 
bureaucratic state—is inevitably constrained by the law’s narrow 
focus on the conduct and responsibility of the individual 
defendants.85  Athenian court procedures, by contrast, could 
comfortably accommodate these non-traditional goals.  Moreover, 
in the modern context, the creation of special transitional justice 
procedures—whether they are courts, truth commissions, or 
procedures for administrative penalties—inevitably raises 
questions of legitimacy on two grounds.  First, they are often 
perceived to be politicized because they are ad hoc institutions 
designed to address a specific political crisis.86  Second, modern 
transitional justice institutions subject individuals to procedures 
and, on occasion, substantive legal standards that did not exist at 
the time the prosecuted conduct occurred.87
Was Athenian legal culture the most important element in the 
success of the reconciliation?  It is impossible to prove definitively, 
but it is worth pointing out that the other obvious, potential factors 
cannot completely explain Athens’ peaceful transition.  Political 
  By contrast, Athens’ 
legal response to the atrocities of the Thirty utilized only pre-
existing democratic legal procedures precisely because these 
procedures could accommodate transitional justice goals.  In this 
way, “transitional justice” in Athens was not a departure from but 
rather an integral part of the restored democratic order. 
 
84 See generally LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (describing the use and 
relevance of extra-legal arguments within the Athenian legal system). 
85 See Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 13 (2002) (“[T]he meaning of historical events often exceeds the 
intentions or actions of particular individuals and can be grasped only by 
attention to structural causes, . . . or a broad institutional logic through which the 
actions by individuals create social effects.”); see also MINOW, supra note 1, at 46–47 
(“[T]he focus on select individuals cannot tell the complex connections among 
people that make massacres and genocides possible.”). 
86 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 30–31 (describing the contemporary 
criticisms of the International Tribunal’s actions during the Nuremberg trials). 
87 See id. (discussing the problem of retroactivity at the Nuremberg, Bosnia 
and Rwanda tribunals); see also TEITEL, supra note 2, at 11–26 (exploring the 
meaning of “the rule of law” within societies undergoing political 
transformation). 
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scientists in the realist tradition often argue that transitional justice 
measures are epiphenomenal, and that successful reconciliations 
can be traced to equilibrium between well-balanced opposing 
forces.  This explanation does not work for the Athenian case.  It is 
true that the initial settlement emerged from a stalemate between 
the rebels and the Spartan-backed oligarchs.  However, once the 
settlement had been made the Spartans quickly made their exit.  
There was no balance of power; the democrats were firmly in 
control and in a position to exact harsh retribution on the former 
oligarchs if they had chosen to do so.  Moreover, the picture that 
emerges of postwar Athens is not of two opposing factions in 
equipoise, but rather of a united restored democracy in which a 
fair number of former oligarchs played an active role.  In addition, 
although Athens faced dire economic and military danger after the 
loss of its empire and could not afford continued internal strife,88 
Thucydides provides examples of other cities in the grip of civil 
war who failed to act rationally, cities for whom, in his words, 
“[r]evenge was more important than self-preservation.”89  
Similarly, the absence of racial or ethnic differences between the 
factions does distinguish Athens from many modern transitions, 
but it does not explain why Athens was more successful than 
other, similarly ethnically homogenous, Greek city-states that also 
experienced civil wars.  Finally, some scholars argue that the 
constitutional reforms at the end of the fifth century removed the 
basis for oligarchic discontent.90
While we cannot determine precisely how much of Athens’ 
success can be attributed to the discourse in the courts, we do 
know that Athens was nearly alone in avoiding the cycle of 
retribution that afflicted other city-states during and after the 
Peloponnesian War.  We also know that its legal system was very 
  But there is no question that, at 
least in intellectual circles, many people—Plato being the most 
prominent example—remained dissatisfied with the democracy 
and were attracted to oligarchic forms of government. 
 
88 See, e.g., OBER, supra note 2, at 98–100 (describing the dire economic and 
political situation in Athens after the war). 
89 See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 209 (Rex Warner 
trans., Penguin Books 1954) (discussing the deterioration of law and order in favor 
of revenge and greed during the revolution in Corcyra) [Thuc. 3.82]. 
90 See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 3, at 14–15 (describing a provision in the 
reformed constitution which promoted democratic procedures by prohibiting the 
use of laws not included within the written code and requiring proposed 
revisions to the law to pass a series of discussions before the Assembly). 
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different from any other city-state, indeed different from just about 
any other legal system the world has known.  Thus it seems 
worthwhile to try to identify aspects of the legal system in Athens 
that may have produced this extraordinary outcome. 
4.1. Courts and Collective Memory 
Legal procedures following administrative massacres can 
influence the society’s “collective memory” of these events, that is, 
the community’s shared understanding of the extent and 
reprehensibility of the atrocities and the relative culpability of the 
different actors.91  Trials can serve as legal rituals, which, in the 
words of David Garland, “provide a kind of didactic theatre 
through which the onlooker is taught what to feel, how to react, 
[and] which sentiments are called for.”92  While there is no 
blueprint for designing transitional justice institutions that will 
positively influence collective memory, the twentieth century 
offers some success stories.93  In Western Europe, for example, it 
has been found that the collective memory of the Holocaust 
(judged from opinion surveys and textbooks) is weakest and least 
accurate in those countries that conducted few or no postwar trials 
of collaborators.94  It is important to note that a society’s collective 
memory need not be historically “accurate” to generate social 
solidarity; the siege of Masada and the denial of extensive French 
collaboration during World War II are examples of shared 
historical fictions that are thought to have fostered solidarity.95
 
91 See, e.g., MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 2 
(1997) (“Trials of those responsible for large-scale state brutality . . . indelibly 
influence collective memory of the events they judge.”); TEITEL, supra note 2 
(exploring how “transitional accountings” helps construct a state’s political 
identity); Koskenniemi, supra note 85, at 12 (describing how past “normality” is 
politicized when seeking transitional justice). 
  
92 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 67 (1990) (emphasis 
added); see also OSIEL, supra note 91, at 2 (“By highlighting official brutality and 
public complicity . . . trials often make people willing to reassess their 
foundational beliefs and constitutive commitments, as few events in political life 
can do.”). 
93 See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 59–239 (describing the positive impact of 
transitional justice institutions in Germany and Japan and identifying the effective 
and ineffective components of the respective institutions). 
94 Id. at 229 (noting that the countries with the weakest collective memories—
Austria, Poland, Italy and the Netherlands—did not conduct significant postwar 
trials). 
95 Id. at 234 (describing the re-characterization of the siege of Masada as a 
means of creating a unified collective memory in Israel). 
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Similarly, we will see that the shared memory of the reign of the 
Thirty tyrants constructed in Athenian court discourse helped 
foster unity by denying the true extent of collaboration and by 
depicting the Amnesty as a gesture of pure benevolence rather 
than a deal struck between evenly-matched forces.96
Despite the Amnesty, the reign of the Thirty was discussed 
frequently in Athenian courts in the generation after the civil war.  
At least one member of the Thirty, and several members of the Ten, 
underwent accountings (euthunai) in court and the prosecution 
speech against Eratosthenes, a member of the Thirty, still 
survives.
 
97  Allegations of wrongdoing during the oligarchy arose 
frequently in examinations of incoming public officials (dokimasia); 
portions of two prosecution speeches and two defense speeches at 
these hearings have survived.98  We also have speeches involving 
two prosecutions that appear to have violated the Amnesty:  the 
prosecution of an informer for homicide, and the paragraphe speech 
challenging the legality of a private suit under the Amnesty which 
attempted to recoup money confiscated during the oligarchy.99
 
96 See Cohen, supra note 59, at 348 (“In Athens, after the restoration, 
democratic politicians realized the uses to which critiques of oligarchy could be 
put and were quick to occupy the high ground of the rule of law by appropriating 
its rhetoric for their cause.”); WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 75 (“Through civic 
discourse, [the Athenians] distanced themselves from the Thirty while 
simultaneously constructing a continuity with the democracy of the fifth 
century.”). 
  In 
addition to trials that centered on events during the civil war, 
97 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113 (accusing 
Eratosthenes of the murder of Lysias’ brother Polemarchus) [Lys. 12]. 
98 The prosecution speeches are:  LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra 
note 6, at 271 (challenging Euandrus at his dokimasia for the archonship based on 
his conduct during the civil war) [Lys. 26]; LYSIAS, Against Philon, in LYSIAS, supra 
note 6, at 308 (challenging the candidature of Philon to the Council of Five 
Hundred) [Lys. 31].  The defense speeches are:  LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, 
supra note 6, at 177 (defending the candidate against accusations of having served 
in the cavalry under the Thirty during a dokimasia) [Lys. 16]; LYSIAS, For 
Eryximachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 378 (defending Eryximachus against the 
allegation that he supported the Thirty during the civil war) [Fr. 9 For 
Eryximachus]. 
99 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137 (prosecuting an 
informer, Agoratus, for murders committed under the Thirty) [Lys. 13]; ISOCRATES, 
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96 (offering the first 
special plea, in which the speaker defends himself against the admissibility of the 
prosecutors charge, in Athenian history) [Isoc. 18]. 
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several court speeches discuss the reign of the Thirty, the Amnesty, 
or the conduct of litigants during the oligarchy.100
Of course, the courts were not the only forum for constructing 
collective memory.  War memorials erected after the restoration of 
the democracy and funeral orations honoring the war’s dead (and 
praising Athens’ superior character and form of government), 
which were delivered annually when Athens was at war, also 
contributed to Athens’ shared understanding of the tyranny and 
the Amnesty.
 
101  Despite the importance of drama and the arts in 
many modern post-conflict societies, Athenian drama was most 
likely less significant in post-war Athens.  From early on, tragedies 
were almost always set outside Athens and were often concerned 
with mythological themes.  When Athenian tragedy did address 
contemporary politics, it only did so obliquely and ambiguously.  
Though comedies in the fifth century, such as those of 
Aristophanes, often parodied issues of the day, by the fourth 
century—the age of “middle comedy”—comic subjects had turned 
from political commentary to domestic life.  In any case, no forum 
could rival the courts as a medium of collective discourse 
regarding the civil war: these courts met approximately 200 times a 
year;102
 
100 See, e.g., ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra 
note 46, at 99, 137 (praising the jury for focusing on preserving the city and unity 
among its citizens) [Andoc. 1.140]; LYSIAS, On the Property of Nicias’ Brother, supra 
note 6, at 195 (discussing the actions of Diognetus during the reign of the Thirty) 
[Lys. 18.10]; LYSIAS, For the Disabled Man, in LYSIAS, supra note 6 (denying 
accusations relating to the defendant’s conduct during the civil war in an effort to 
receive a disability pension) [Lys. 24]; LYSIAS, On Overthrowing the Democracy, in 
LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 265 (discussing how the litigant did not take advantage of 
the chaos and punish his enemies or attempt to advantage his friends during the 
city’s defeat) [Lys. 25.15]; LYSIAS, Against Ergocles, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 291 
(challenging the defendant on his actions while in office) [Lys. 28.12]; LYSIAS, 
Against Nicomachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 301 (discussing political intrigues 
that were aided by laws the defendant produced) [Lys. 30.12]; Plato, supra note 28, 
at 57 (describing the oligarchy under the Thirty) [Pl. Apol. 32 c–d]. 
 the importance of character evidence made discussion of 
101 See WOLPERT, supra note 5, at 87–90 (discussing the functions of war 
memorials in Athens and how certain war memorials became symbols of the 
Athenian democracy).  The only surviving epitaphios from the immediate 
postwar period is Lysias 2, which does praise the Athenians’ decision to forgo 
punishment in favor of unity.  LYSIAS, Funeral Speech, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 38–
39 [Lys. 2.60–65].  For a brilliant study of how funeral orations helped construct a 
semi-official (and misleading) history of Athens, see NICOLE LORAUX, THE 
INVENTION OF ATHENS (1986). 
102 See MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF 
DEMOSTHENES: STRUCTURE, PRINCIPLES, AND IDEOLOGY 186 (J.A. Crook trans., Univ. 
of Okla. 1999) (noting that the courts met approximately 200 times per year). 
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the civil war likely in cases tried in the postwar period;103
The discourse in the courts fostered reconciliation in three 
ways, which I will discuss in turn:  (1) discrediting the oligarchy by 
depicting the horrors of the tyranny; (2) constructing unity by 
downplaying the extent of collaboration and focusing blame on the 
Thirty; and (3) praising the Amnesty as characteristic of the 
Athenians’ unusual wisdom and benevolence.
 and 
hundreds of jurors were present at each case. 
104
4.1.1. Discrediting the Oligarchy 
 
Athenian trials publicized the crimes committed by the Thirty, 
thereby discrediting the former regime.  The broad notion of 
evidence in Athenian courts permitted prosecutors to reach 
beyond the specific charges against the defendant to describe the 
larger pattern of tyranny.  For example, the prosecution of an 
informant whose testimony led to a judicial murder early in the 
Thirty’s reign, includes discussion of atrocities that did not involve 
the defendant and were committed after the events in question, 
including the massacres of Salamis and Eleusis, unjust arrests and 
executions, confiscations of property, and the expulsion of all but 
the 3000 from the city.105  The trial at Eratosthenes’ accounting 
provides another example.  The prosecution speech includes a 
detailed and poignant description of the murder of the speaker’s 
brother in the massacre of the resident aliens that emphasizes the 
outrageousness of the Thirty, who had the audacity to rip the 
earrings directly from the ears of the victim’s wife and refused to 
let the family have one of the victim’s cloaks to give him a proper 
burial.106
 
103 See LANNI, supra note 13, at 41–74 (discussing the use and influence of 
character evidence in cases heard in post war Athenian courts). 
  But the speech also includes a detailed account of how 
104 See WOLPERT, supra note 5 (analyzing the discussions of the civil war by 
court speakers and noting the rhetorical strategies discussed in this Section); 
Cohen, supra note 59 (discussing the rhetorical strategies employed in courts to 
foster reconciliation). 
105 See LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148–49 
(describing the disasters that befell Athens after Agoratus killed the men who 
went to the Council’s chamber to face trial) [Lys. 13.43–48]. 
106 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 119 (noting 
that the Thirty’s administration of justice toward Polemarchus began with a 
summary arrest and instructions to drink hemlock and ended with the denial of a 
customary burial) [Lys. 12.17–19]. 
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the oligarchy came to power107 and a recitation of the collective 
crimes of the Thirty.108  While the speaker opines that many 
prosecutors would be required to describe all the crimes of the 
Thirty,109
These public airings in court of the oligarchy’s horrific crimes 
helped discredit not only the former regime, but also oligarchic 
opposition to the democracy more generally.
 the speech does manage to provide a broad-ranging 
account of the crimes committed under the oligarchy and an 
assessment of where the primary responsibility should lie. 
110  The repressive rule 
of the Thirty, with its rigged trials and extra-judicial murders, 
made it easy for democrats to associate oligarchy with lawless 
tyranny.  Although oligarchic sympathies survived and even 
thrived in elite intellectual circles in the fourth century,111 oligarchy 
became a political non-starter after the civil war.  As Cohen points 
out, decades later even those too young to have been involved in 
the Thirty could be tarred with accusations of having oligarchic 
tendencies.112  The prosecutor in an assault case derides his 
opponent:  “Even if he is younger than those who held power then 
[i.e., under the oligarchy], he has the character of that government.  
These were the natures that betrayed our empire to the enemy, 
razed the walls of our homeland, and executed fifteen hundred of 
our citizens without trial.”113
4.1.2. Constructing Unity 
 
Like many modern transitional justice legal procedures, then, 
Athenian trials helped to instill a shared sense of condemnation of 
the crimes committed by the former regime.  But while many 
 
107 See id. at 130–31 (describing Theramenes’ political strategy for depriving 
the people of hope in order to overpower them) [Lys. 12.70]. 
108 See id. at 135 (calling for a display of anger for the crimes committed by 
the Thirty) [Lys. 12. 95–96]. 
109 See id. at 136 (closing the argument in the prosecution speech against 
Eratosthenes, a former member of the Thirty, and calling for a favorable verdict) 
[Lys. 12.99]. 
110 See Cohen, supra note 59, at 347–49 (discussing the methods used to 
discredit the oligarchy). 
111 Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle are prominent examples. 
112 See Cohen, supra note 59, at 347–49 (discussing the accusations placed 
upon those who lived under the oligarchy even where they had no direct role in 
its rule). 
113 ISOCRATES, Against Lochites, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 123, 126 [Isoc. 
20.10–11]; see also Cohen, supra note 59, at 349 (discussing the lasting taint of the 
oligarchy on those who lived under its rule). 
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modern tribunals or truth commissions seek in part to encourage 
the broader public to engage in self-scrutiny and confront their 
own complicity,114 Athenian court speakers did nothing of the 
kind.  In the decades after the civil war, litigants who discussed the 
violence under the oligarchy took pains to focus blame narrowly 
on the Thirty while downplaying the extent of collaboration.  This 
understanding of events was quite explicit in the speeches.  To cite 
one stark example:  in discussing the massacre of the metics 
(resident aliens) at the accounting of Eratosthenes, the prosecutor 
states, “[t]he rest of the Athenians [i.e. those not in the Thirty], it 
seems to me, could have a plausible excuse for what happened by 
laying the blame on the Thirty . . . .”115  Both defendants and 
prosecutors in suits involving participation in the crimes of the 
oligarchy take this approach, depicting the entire citizenry as 
opponents and victims of the Thirty.116
Lysias’ depiction in the accounting trial of Eratosthenes of the 
process by which the Thirty came to power provides an example.  
His narrative places blame squarely on Theramenes, a member of 
the Thirty, and minimizes the role of the Athenians who did, after 
all, vote the Thirty into office.
  Undoubtedly the speakers 
(and their speechwriters) chose this tack because they thought that 
it would be well received by the jurors.  But the effect of this 
rhetorical strategy was to help construct a misleading collective 
memory of a unified populace victimized by the tyrannical Thirty. 
117
 
114 See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 192–95 (discussing the trial of Auschwitz 
guards, which seems to have had this effect, and the 1983 junta trial in Argentina, 
which also seems to have been premised on this idea, but was less successful). 
  Lysias’ account of the Assembly 
meeting minimizes the citizens’ responsibility as much as possible:  
he states that many in the Assembly initially opposed the proposal, 
and even after the Spartan general threatened to destroy Athens if 
they did not acquiesce, some Athenians got up and left the 
115 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 121 [Lys. 
12.28]. 
116 See id. at 121 (addressing the jurors as victims of the Thirty) [Lys. 12.30]; 
LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 274–78 (illustrating how 
the prosecutors depicted the entire citizenry as the victims of the Thirty in the 
trials of Euandrus) [Lys. 26.1–16]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in 
ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 97 (assuming all the juries had been in Piraeus rather 
than the city) [Isoc. 18.2]. 
117 See LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 130–31 
(chronicling the Thirty’s rise to power beginning with Theramenes’ demand that 
the city be entrusted to the control of thirty men) [Lys. 12.70–75]. 
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Assembly, others stayed but remained silent, and only a “few evil-
minded scoundrels voted the proposal through.”118
Perhaps most striking is the historical fiction, employed in 
several speeches, that every member of the jury was a member of 
the resistance in the Piraeus and/or a direct victim of the Thirty.  
As several scholars have pointed out, although most jury panels 
must have included members of the 3000 and other types of 
collaborators, speakers regularly address the jury as former men of 
the Piraeus, and describe how the jurors, addressed as “you,” were 
driven out of the city, had their property confiscated, houses 
invaded and family members taken, took part in freeing the city, 
and returned from the Piraeus.
 
 119
A rare exception is a passage in Lysias’ prosecution of 
Eratosthenes at his accounting, in which he briefly addresses 
“those from the city (astu)” and “those from the Piraeus” 
separately.  But even this passage has a unifying message.  Lysias 
depicts the men who remained in the city as innocent victims 
forced to fight against their own kin:  “you who are from the town 
should realize that the defendants ruled you so badly that you 
were compelled to fight a war against your brothers, your sons, 
and your fellow-citizens . . . .”
 
120
 
118 Id. at 131 [Lys. 12.75]. 
 The prosecutor goes on to 
emphasize that the former men of the city have gone from being 
slaves of the oligarchy and their Spartan garrison to participating 
in governing the polis and joining with the democrats to protect it 
from external threats: 
119 For prosecutors’ attempts to persuade juries that the defendants were the 
victims of the crimes committed by the Thirty, see id. at 121, 127 [Lys. 12.30, 57], 
LYSIAS, Against Agoratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 137, 148–49 [Lys. 13.47], and 
LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 274 [Lys. 26.2].  See also 
ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 99, 
122 (addressing the jury as if they were all direct opponents of the Thirty’s rule 
and direct participants in the restoration of democracy) [Andoc. 1.81]; ISOCRATES, 
Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 96, 97 (assuming 
that the entire jury had been in exile in the Piraeus) [Isoc. 18.2]; WOLPERT, supra 
note 5, at 90–94 (describing why speakers address the jury as though they had all 
been in the Piraeus); Cohen, supra note 59, at 341 (discussing the nature of the 
prosecutions of those who had collaborated with the Thirty). 
120 LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 135 [Lys. 12.92].  
See also ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in Isocrates I, supra note 2, at 
101, 101–02 (emphasizing that while some citizens participated in arrests and 
property confiscations they did so only out of compulsion) [Isoc. 18.17]. 
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Realize that you were ruled by the defendants, who were 
the worst of men; realize too that you now share the 
government with good men, you are fighting against 
external enemies, and you are taking counsel for the city; 
and remember the mercenaries [i.e., the Spartan garrison 
employed by the Thirty] that the defendants established on 
the Acropolis as guardians of their power and of your 
slavery.121
One speaker goes so far as to state that the men who did not 
actively participate in the killings but remained in the city can 
claim credit for the overthrow of the oligarchy, suggesting, 
contrary to our historical evidence, that victory was secured by 
widespread political opposition within the city.
 
122
4.1.3. Praising Amnesty 
  To be sure, the 
use of these rhetorical topoi in court did not erase individual 
victims’ resentment against specific collaborators who had done 
them harm.  But the collective memory of the oligarchy constructed 
in the courts may have made victims more willing to trust men 
whose level of active collaboration was minimal or unknown to 
them.  For those who had remained in the city, the discourse in the 
courts offered a rationalization for past collaboration and provided 
comfort that there was a place for them in the restored democracy. 
Finally, court speeches in the years after the civil war helped 
create a myth in which the Amnesty, and the forgiveness that it 
implied, exemplified the Athenians’ superior character.  To be sure, 
defendants accused of collaboration often defend the Amnesty on 
pragmatic grounds, arguing that taking retribution would 
endanger the democracy by alienating former oligarchs.123
 
121 LYSIAS, Against Eratosthenes, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 113, 135 [Lys. 12.94]. 
  But 
122 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 278–79 
(attributing the defeat of the Thirty to the people) [Lys. 26.18–19]. 
123 See ANDOCIDES, supra note 46, at 128 (noting the importance of the jurors’ 
decisions in creating precedents for which laws and customs will be followed by 
the public) [Andoc. 1.105]; ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES 
I, supra note 2, at 96, 106 (arguing that if amnesty is destroyed then civil strife will 
result) [Isoc. 18.44]; LYSIAS, On Overthrowing the Democracy, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, 
at 260, 262–68 (speaking in defense of his right to hold public office and arguing 
that the jury should be wary of alienating citizens with accusations of misdeeds 
during the civil war) [Lys. 25.1–28]; James M. Quillin, Achieving Amnesty: The Role 
of Events, Institutions, and Ideas, 132 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 71 
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speakers also praise the Amnesty in a way that made a powerful 
appeal to the Athenians’ honor.  In these passages, the Amnesty is 
transformed from a concession made out of military necessity to an 
act of will that defines the Athenian democratic spirit. 124  Speakers 
argue that the Athenians’ willingness to reject revenge earned 
them a reputation throughout Greece for extraordinary generosity, 
reasonableness, and wisdom.125
[W]hile our ancestors accomplished many noble things, the 
city has won renown not least from these settlements.  You 
can find many cities that have fought nobly in war, but no 
one could point to a city better advised with regard to civil 
strife (stasis).  Moreover, of those activities that carry risk, 
one might ascribe the greatest part to luck, but no one 
would attribute the credit for our moderation to anything 
other than our intelligence.
  Under this re-imagining, the 
Amnesty was not a reminder of the darkest period in Athenian 
history, but rather the manifestation of one its high points, worthy 
of celebration.  The speaker in Isocrates 18 states: 
126
We can see evidence that this identification as a democracy 
with moderation took root:  in the fourth century authors refer to 
the Athenians’ characteristic mildness or forbearance in contexts 
unrelated to the civil war.
 
127
 
(2002) (arguing that the surprising leniency toward former oligarchs was rational 
because it appeased former oligarchs and prevented unrest). 
  Again, it is difficult to imagine that 
124 See AESCHINES, On the Embassy, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 88, 156 
(stating that because of the Amnesty “the world thought our city exceptionally 
wise”) [Aesch. 2.176]; ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, 
supra note 46, at 99, 137–38 (praising the Athenians’ wisdom in refraining from 
taking revenge on those who lived under the Thirty’s rule and arguing that the 
public’s unified vote would determine whether they would rely on the laws of 
Athens or find other means to escape their accusers) [Andoc. 1.140]; Cohen, supra 
note 59, at 354–55 (noting that the portrayal of reconciliation helped unify the 
polis over its enemies); ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, 
supra note 2,  at 96, 102, 104 (praising Athenians for their moderation and wisdom 
in dealing with civil strife) [Isoc. 18.22, 31–32]. 
125 See ANDOCIDES, On the Mysteries, in ANTIPHON AND ANDOCIDES, supra note 
46, at 99, 137–38 (praising the Athenians as generous and sensible for not seeking 
revenge) [Andoc. 1.140]; AESCHINES, On the Embassy, in AESCHINES, supra note 2, at 
88, 156  (noting that the success of the Amnesty earned the Athenians a world-
wide reputation for wisdom) [Aesch. 2.176]. 
126 ISOCRATES, Special Plea Against Callimachus, in ISOCRATES I, supra note 2, at 
96, 104 [Isoc. 18.31–32]. 
127 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 165 (discussing how within the 
customary forbearance of the Athenian democracy, only those who had 
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these encomia of the Amnesty could induce victims to forgive 
individuals directly responsible for the murder of their kin.  
Nevertheless, the Amnesty—which was reaffirmed by collective 
oath each year by jurors and members of the Council and was 
widely praised in court speeches—may have had some expressive 
effect, encouraging the Athenians to live up to their myths and 
take a more conciliatory attitude toward former collaborators who 
did not personally cause them harm. 
4.2. Courts and Indirect Accountability 
A recurring theme in studies of modern transitions is that 
many victims seem to get more satisfaction from the punishment 
or acknowledgment of guilt by local perpetrators, as distinguished 
from broad-ranging investigations of wrongdoing or trials of high-
level war criminals.128  A common complaint among modern 
victims is repeatedly seeing neighbors, co-workers, and fellow-
villagers who collaborated in atrocities going about their lives as if 
nothing had happened.129
 
committed crimes during civil unrest were not allowed to live in Athens) [Ar. Ath. 
Pol. 22.4]; LYSIAS, Against Andocides, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 61, 71–72 (referring 
to the Athenians’ “gentleness” with regard to criminal prosecution) [Lys. 6.34].  
See Margaretha DeBrunner Hall, Even Dogs have Erinyes:  Sanctions in Athenian 
Practice and Thinking, in GREEK LAW IN ITS POLITICAL SETTING 73, 88–89 (L. Foxhall & 
A.D.E. Lewis eds., 1996) (discussing the Athenians’ reputation for mildness and 
arguing that this reputation was largely undeserved). 
  Due to the fact that Athenian victims 
128 See, e.g., Anita Isaacs, Truth and the Challenge of Reconciliation in Guatemala, 
in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 116, 136–39 
(Joanna Quinn ed., 2009) (discussing the importance of informal 
acknowledgements to local communities in righting wrongs); Eric Stover, 
Witnesses and the Promise of Justice in the Hague, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: 
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 104, 107 (Eric Stover 
& Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004) (describing the feeling of dissatisfaction 
experienced by witnesses who felt that their work would not be complete until 
they testified against local war criminals).  This insight is also part of the impetus 
behind the gacaca courts in Rwanda.  See generally Urusaro Karekezi, Alphonse 
Nshimiyimana, & Beth Mutamba, Localizing Justice:  Gacaca Courts in Post-genocide 
Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH 
OF MASS ATROCITY 69, 69–84 (Eric Stover & Harvey Weinstein eds., 2004) 
(discussing the use of gacaca courts which allow local communities to bring 
charges against genocide suspects who allegedly committed atrocities in said 
communities). 
129 See Dmitri A. Sotiropoulos, Swift Gradualism and Variable Outcomes: Vetting 
in Post-Authoritarian Greece, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION: VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 121 (Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 
2007) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS PREVENTION] (telling the story of a former member of 
the resistance who had been imprisoned under military rule and who on the way 
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could indirectly sanction collaborators for their conduct during the 
oligarchy, the Athenians were able to minimize this “impunity 
gap” at the local level, while still maintaining the unifying 
collective narrative of rejecting vengeance for Amnesty.  In this 
way, the courts fostered reconciliation by offering some 
accountability as a safety valve for local resentments based on 
crimes committed during the reign of the Thirty. 
Collaboration could be raised in court, without violating the 
terms of the Amnesty, in two forms:  (1) as character evidence in an 
unrelated public or private lawsuit; and (2) in the dokimasia, the 
examination of incoming magistrates.  Where collaboration was 
introduced in an unrelated lawsuit, it was up to the individual jury 
to determine how much weight to accord this character evidence in 
reaching its verdict.  At the accounting, anyone who wished could 
challenge a candidate for any reason, including collaboration.  If 
rejected by the jury, the only penalty was disqualification for office.  
The accounting procedure shares some similarities with modern 
forms of administrative justice, such as de-Nazification in 
Germany and lustration in post-Communist Europe.  In all three 
contexts, those who were affiliated with or participated in the 
former regime could be barred from public office and/or public 
employment.130
Athens’ indirect accountability mechanisms reduced victims’ 
worries about impunity, but did not go so far as to alienate former 
collaborators by doling out severe sanctions.  Most citizens were 
likely to be selected by lot for office or to face litigation at some 
point in their lives,
 
131
 
to work, passed by the judge who convicted him sitting in a coffee shop every 
morning, and of another resistance member who had been tortured learning that 
his torturer had become the chief of police).  For similar stories, see Isaacs, supra 
note 128, at 136, which shows that victims in Guatemala lived near informants or 
executioners, and TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND 321 (1996), which 
illustrates how Stasi informants were banned from holding public sector jobs for 
fifteen years. 
 leaving them vulnerable to attacks based on 
their conduct during the oligarchy.  However, this mechanism was 
130 See TEITEL, supra note 2, at 149–90 (discussing the use and forms of 
administrative justice during periods of political transformation). See generally 
JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 129 (discussing various vetting procedures 
where members of old regimes were prevented from participating in newly 
formed governments or public positions). 
131 See Adriaan Lanni, Social Norms in the Courts of Ancient Athens, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 691, 693 (2009) (discussing both the collaborative and contentious 
environment Athenian citizens faced). 
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self-limiting in that collaboration only became an issue in court if a 
victim or an enemy brought it up.  Victims who needed to air their 
grievances against a particular collaborator were given the 
opportunity to do so, but there was no attempt to systematically 
stigmatize or exclude from office all those who participated in the 
oligarchy. 
The uncertainty over whether and when former collaborators 
in one’s village would face punishment through these indirect 
mechanisms was much less troubling for those seeking retribution 
in the context of a society that believed in divine sanctions.  Divine 
sanctions were uncertain and unpredictable, and could occur years 
or even generations after a violation.132  Even the awareness that 
those who had participated in the oligarchy might face indirect 
sanctions in court at some later time may have tempered victims’ 
perception of impunity.133
At the same time, these potential indirect sanctions were not so 
severe that they risked permanently alienating former 
collaborators.  For one thing, the only penalty that attached to 
being rejected at one’s accounting was disqualification from office.  
Men who were disqualified in this way could still participate fully 
in the Assembly and the law courts.
 
134  Moreover, participation 
under the Thirty did not doom a litigant or prospective magistrate; 
this evidence was merely one factor in the jury’s consideration.135
 
132 See Adriaan Lanni, The Laws of War in Ancient Greece, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 
469, 475 (2008) (discussing the Athenian belief in punishment from the gods). 
  
One man, challenged at his dokimasia because he was a member of 
the Council and the cavalry under the Thirty, nevertheless appears 
to have been confirmed as an archon, one of the highest offices of 
133 Of course, a lack of apology or recognition of guilt on the part of the 
perpetrators might diminish victims’ satisfaction.  The limited sense of 
accountability provided by the Athenian procedures was more acceptable to 
victims in part because the oligarchic sympathizers who were most likely to draw 
retaliation probably opted to resettle in Eleusis.  See ELSTER, supra note 3, at 22–23, 
who points out that by the time some of those settlers returned to Athens after the 
fall of Eleusis in 401 BC, retributive emotions had some time to diminish. 
134 The one exception was that those who were convicted under the dokimasia 
ton rhetoron were rendered ineligible to speak in the Assembly. 
135 See LYSIAS, For Polystratus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 217, 219–27 (defending 
Polystratus successfully against loss of his rights as a citizen despite charges of 
oligarchic sympathies) [Lys. 20]; LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 
177, 181 (giving another example of a man being confirmed in office despite 
challenges at the dokimasia) [Lys. 16.9]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
LANNI.DOC 1/13/2011  6:45 PM 
586 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
the democracy.136  Another court speaker suggests that many 
cavalry members under the oligarchy went on to serve in the 
Council and even as generals.137
Perhaps most importantly, wide-ranging examination of 
litigants’ and prospective magistrates’ character was routine in 
Athenian courts.  Defendants would not experience discussion of 
their conduct under the oligarchy and any resulting indirect 
sanctions as a specific attack aimed at former collaborators, but as 
standard operating procedure in court.  In fact, one defendant in a 
dokimasia claims that he is glad to have the opportunity to refute 
widespread accusations that he served in the cavalry under the 
Thirty: 
 
The people who force those who are unjustly accused to 
undergo an investigation of their life’s record are in my 
view responsible for great benefits. I am so utterly 
confident in myself that I expect even someone badly 
disposed toward me to change his mind when he hears me 
speak about what happened and to think much better of me 
in the future.138
Like many modern vetting procedures, such as lustration, the 
examination of an individual’s conduct under the previous regime 
in the accounting was both backward- and forward-looking.
 
139
 
136 See LYSIAS, Against Euandrus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 271, 273 (discussing 
the unsuccessful prosecution of Euandrus who later served as an archon) [Lys. 
26]. 
  
Disqualification from office was both a sanction for past 
137 See LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 181 (stating that 
several cavalry members under the oligarchy went on to hold high offices) [Lys. 
16.8]. 
138 Id. at 179–80 [Lys. 16.1–3]. Of course, litigants were vulnerable to 
completely fabricated accusations of collaboration, just as they could face false 
accusations of all sorts of violations of legal and social norms in court.  This 
problem was at least reduced by the availability of suits for false witness and the 
likelihood that someone among the hundreds of jurors or spectators might have 
knowledge of the facts and shout down the speaker. 
139 See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing Czechoslovakia’s use of 
lustration to bar former state security personnel from a wide variety of jobs).  See 
generally JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 129 (discussing various vetting 
measures including lustration).  See CHRISTIANE WILKE, The Shield, the Sword and the 
Party: Vetting the East German Public Sector, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION, supra note 
129, at 348, 349 (observing that even when the stated purpose of modern vetting 
procedures is a forward-looking one, such as in East Germany, the social 
understanding of these procedures is often as a backward-looking sanction). 
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wrongdoing and a safeguard to prevent those who committed 
crimes or who had oligarchic sympathies from exercising power in 
the restored democracy.  But unlike most modern vetting 
procedures, the accounting was as concerned with a candidate’s 
current political commitments and view of the Thirty as with his 
past conduct under the former regime.  Wolpert points out that the 
accounting served in part as a ritual in which former collaborators 
publicly pledged their allegiance to the democratic constitution.140  
This does not mean that former collaborators expressed remorse or 
even admitted participation in the oligarchy — in our surviving 
speeches, litigants and prospective magistrates accused of 
collaboration vehemently deny that they held offices under the 
Thirty — or were in any way involved in the crimes committed by 
the regime.141
In sum, the indirect sanctions for collaboration made possible 
by the Athenians’ distinctive legal culture ranged far wider than 
any direct trials of collaborators could possibly have done.  These 
mechanisms encouraged reconciliation by minimizing the 
resentment created by the sense that local collaborators enjoyed 
impunity and by offering a procedure whereby those with 
  Due to the fact that very few magistrates exercised 
significant individual power, the importance of the dokimasia to the 
security of the democracy lay less in accurately ferreting out and 
excluding from office those with oligarchic sympathies and more 
in the symbolism of these hearings.  Having passed a dokimasia, a 
former collaborator might gain a sense of membership and 
belonging under the new regime, and resentment at a 
collaborators’ holding office might be eased by his public 
repudiation of the oligarchy.  Conversely, rejecting a candidate 
allowed the demos to make a statement about the sort of 
collaboration that it deemed incompatible with full citizenship. 
 
140 See LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 180 (declaring 
Mantitheus’s loyalty to the current Athenian Constitution) [Lys. 16.3]; WOLPERT, 
supra note 5, at 115–16 (discussing the “suspension of belief” Athenian juries 
exercised in hearing testimony from former collaborators in which they denied 
any wrongdoing and declared their current allegiance). 
141 E.g., LYSIAS, For Mantitheus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 177, 181 (denying 
any wrongdoing) [Lys. 16.8]; LYSIAS, On a Charge of Overthrowing the Democracy, in 
LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 260, 265 (denying criminal conduct during the oligarchy) 
[Lys. 25.15–16]; LYSIAS, For Eryximachus, in LYSIAS, supra note 6, at 378, 381 
(asserting his innocence under the rule of the Thirty) [Lys. Fr. 9.110]; PLATO, supra 
note 28, at 57 (denying participation in the crimes of the Thirty, specifically the 
arrest of Leon of Salamis) [Pl. Apol. 32 c–d]. 
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questionable pasts could be publicly reintegrated into the 
community. 
4.3. Participation and Social Repair 
Scholars who study conflict resolution and transitional justice 
often rely on the “contact hypothesis,” the assumption that 
“tension and hostility between [opposing] groups will be reduced 
when these groups are brought in systematic contact with each 
other.”142
Jury service in the courts was just one of the many 
opportunities for men of the city and men of the Piraeus to interact 
productively after the civil war.  Other venues for joint decision-
making included the Assembly, the Council, and the deme 
(village) assemblies.  Service on the Council of 500 involved 
particularly intense interaction.  The Council met about 275 days a 
year.  During the one-tenth of the year that each member served on 
the fifty-person executive committee, he was expected to live and 
work in the Council chamber with the rest of the committee.  
Participation in several civic institutions—Council service, military 
service, and performance of the dithyrambic chorus at the Festival 
of Dionysus, for example—was organized according to tribe, 
which meant that one was more likely to participate alongside 
members of one’s local village.  Repeated productive interactions 
in these various contexts between collaborators and the men of the 
Piraeus may have helped to rebuild trust and foster cooperation 
after the restoration of democracy. 
  Athens’ highly participatory civic institutions may have 
helped foster reconciliation by encouraging members on opposite 
sides of the civil war to work together in a variety of contexts. 
5. CONTEMPORARY LESSONS 
Every society in transition must manage the inherent tension 
between the impulse to go back over the past—to understand, to 
record for history, to judge, and to punish—and the impulse to 
move on, to forfeit full accountability in the interests of peace and 
reconciliation.143
 
142 Caitlin Donnelly & Joanne Hughes, Contact and Culture: Mechanisms of 
Reconciliation in Schools in Northern Ireland and Israel, in RECONCILIATION(S): 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 147, 150 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 
2009). 
  We have seen that ancient Athens’ successful 
143 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the tension between 
acknowledgement and recovery when dealing with past atrocities). 
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reconciliation managed this tension in a unique way.  The 
Athenians put the past behind them by instituting a formal 
amnesty, by creating a unifying (and misleading) collective 
narrative of the war, and by providing opportunities for the 
reintegration of collaborators in the democracy and shared 
experiences between former antagonists.  At the same time, 
Athens’ legal institutions offered an outlet for private, local 
resentments by providing ordinary victims with an indirect means 
of airing accusations against quite specific oppressors. 
What lessons might the Athenian experience offer for those 
designing transitional justice institutions today?  Much of 
transitional justice scholarship utilizes the case-study method; 
scholars analyze the advantages and disadvantages of various 
forms of transitional justice institutions in part by examining how 
these institutions performed in a variety of historical and/or 
contemporary situations.144  This Article presents Athens as a case 
study of how one society was able to move on.145
The types of lessons we can draw from the Athenian case are 
limited by evident cultural differences.  The wholesale adoption of 
specific Athenian practices is obviously not in the cards, 
particularly since the absence of the rule of law is a feature of the 
system rather than a bug.  Rather, as noted previously, the 
Athenian case provides some mid-level observations about factors 
that may contribute to a successful transition.  The Athenian 
experience suggests (1) the importance of granularity, that is, 
letting individual victims at the local level decide whether to 
prosecute their antagonists; and (2) that uncovering the truth is not 
always the best way to ensure peace and reconciliation following 
 
 
144 See generally RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT 
SOCIETIES (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) (citing several individual case studies); 
ELSTER, supra note 3 (discussing a variety of historical examples of transitional 
justice); MINOW, supra note 1 (analyzing the different emotional and political 
responses to atrocities which were adopted by various countries and populations 
throughout history); TEITEL, supra note 2 (drawing comparisons between several 
historical and contemporary approaches to transitional justice); Koskenniemi, 
supra note 85 (discussing the function of trials in the context of war crimes in 
Europe); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3 (analyzing the costs and benefits of 
transitional justice in the context of several historical transitions). 
145 It is, of course, impossible to draw definitive conclusions from any 
individual case study.  Rather, each case study is merely suggestive, offering some 
insight into how a particular approach to transitional justice played out in a 
specific context.  Hypotheses derived from individual case studies must then be 
tested against other case studies, with close attention to cultural, political, or 
economic factors that might cause a successful approach to fail in other contexts. 
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atrocities.  These observations from the Athenian case offer insight 
into prominent contemporary issues in transitional justice.  First, 
the Athenian experience suggests that attention to local 
resentments and ordinary victims and perpetrators may be just as 
important as centralized, exemplary justice or the exposure of the 
command structure behind atrocities.  Second, the Athenian 
experience invites us to reexamine whether the focus on truth 
seeking (so common in contemporary transitional justice 
institutions) is well founded.  In this Part, I will explore each of 
these claims in some detail. 
5.1. Addressing Local Resentments Through Private Complaint 
Procedures 
The Athenian experience suggests that piecemeal private 
prosecution or complaint procedures at the local level may be as 
important as the more centralized, systematic schemes directed by 
public officials that tend to dominate contemporary transitional 
justice institutions. 
We have seen that ancient Athens had no systematic program 
of punishing, or even excluding from office, former oligarchic 
sympathizers.  Most of the high-level officials under the Thirty fled 
to Eleusis or into exile, and the remainder of the population was 
protected from direct litigation by the Amnesty.  Rather, indirect 
sanctions for collaboration were initiated by individual victims and 
acquaintances, which provided a safety valve to ease local 
resentment in the absence of direct sanctions.  Punishment for 
collaboration was selective and exemplary, in the sense that many 
collaborators escaped these accusations, but there was no official 
decision to single out particular offenders for punishment.  In this 
way, the flexibility of the Athenian legal system mitigated the 
tension between ordinary, rule-of-law justice and expedient 
political settlement.  The Athenian approach also created the 
possibility of piecemeal retributive justice without forcing the all-
or-nothing choice that a comprehensive, top-down system invites. 
Many modern forms of transitional justice, particularly 
prosecutions, involve a centralized approach that attempts to focus 
selectively on the most serious violations and, to the extent 
possible, high-level offenders.146
 
146 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 31, 40–45 (describing the factors which 
influence selectivity in prosecution and punishment as well as the dangers of this 
selectivity); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 27–68 (discussing various successor trials 
  Most contemporary criminal 
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approaches involve prosecutors or other public officials 
consciously selecting individual defendants whose trials can 
provide exemplary justice, in addition to furthering other goals, 
including the shaping of collective memory.147  Most students of 
transitional justice assume that one aim of these selective 
approaches should be to focus on tracing responsibility as far up 
the chain of command as possible.148  Instances where low-level 
actors have faced prosecution, such as the trial of German guards 
for shooting individuals attempting to escape over the Berlin Wall, 
have drawn widespread criticism.149  Indeed, the difficulty of 
proving criminal responsibility for high-level actors is commonly 
cited as an advantage that truth commissions have over criminal 
prosecutions.150  Most of these modern approaches are not just 
deliberately selective; they are also deliberately centralized.  In fact, 
some scholars have argued that the very act of transferring the 
responsibility for accusation and punishment from victims to 
public bodies is absolutely essential to ending hatred and 
promoting reconciliation.151
The Athenian example suggests that given the inevitably 
selective nature of transitional justice, centralization and focusing 
exclusively on major crimes and high-level officials may be 
misguided.  The Athenian experience is in keeping with some 
recent research on contemporary transitions noting that victims 
 
 
throughout the course of history which have held prior political regimes 
responsible for past injustices). 
147 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 46 (“[C]ollective memory probably can 
only be enshrined through trials if the intention to achieve this end is concealed 
from the public audience . . . .”); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 69–118 (analyzing the role 
that legal processes play in constructing transitional narratives of history). 
148 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 40–42, 59–61 (discussing the perceived 
unfairness of prosecuting subordinates without holding their superiors 
responsible and the need to prioritize the interests of the victims). 
149 See id. at 59 (describing a similar chain of command involved in the 
atrocities in South Africa and emphasizing the difficulty of unraveling this type of 
hierarchical responsibility); TEITEL, supra note 2, at 40 (describing the broad scope 
of the trials in Germany after the Berlin Wall shootings). 
150 See MINOW, supra note 1, at 60–61 (stating that one advantage truth 
commissions have over trials is the commissions’ ability to assign blame to high-
level actors in cases where the chain of responsibility would be hard to establish 
in a court of law). 
151 See id. at 11–12 (discussing the commonly-held view that “the way to 
avoid such escalating violence,” arising out of hatred and a desire for vengeance, 
“is to transfer the responsibilities for apportioning blame and punishment from 
victims to public bodies acting according to the rule of law”). 
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often find investigations and prosecutions of local, low-level 
perpetrators more satisfying than punishment or investigation of 
high-level offenders.152  The Athenian case offers some support for 
approaches that do not maintain a centralized monopoly on 
prosecutions but rather provide outlets for individual victims to 
pursue local grievances, including grievances against relatively 
low-level offenders.  Modern approaches in this vein include the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Gacaca courts of Rwanda.  In South Africa, individual victims were 
provided the opportunity to give testimony before the human 
rights committee in a non-adversarial format.153  In Rwanda, each 
local community—acting through the local general assembly—met 
to identify for trial those suspected of involvement in local 
massacres.154  As these two examples demonstrate, such 
decentralized, locally focused, victim-centered approaches can take 
a variety of forms, and can be deployed alongside more systematic, 
top-down institutions.155
 
152 See, e.g., ISAACS, supra note 128, at 136 (citing the Guatemala case as an 
example where victims “frequently insist that neighbors, friends, and relatives are 
guilty, implicated in the crimes whether as informants or as executioners”); 
Stover, supra note 128, at 106, 115 (emphasizing the importance victims placed on 
receiving explanations and apologies from their neighbors and seeing fellow 
citizens being brought to justice). 
  The Athenian experience does not 
recommend a particular institutional design, but merely suggests 
that approaches that provide an outlet for local, individual 
153 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 1, at 72–74 (emphasizing the contrast between 
the more communal qualities of truth commissions and the rigid, discrete roles of 
traditional courts). 
154 See KAREKEZI, supra note 128, at 72 (describing at the local level how 
Gacaca courts were implemented by observing three phases that were common 
practices throughout all gacaca courts); Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and 
“Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 777–89 (2007) (describing the evolution of the gacaca 
courts in Rwanda and the multifaceted purposes served by these courts in the 
Rwandan government and community). 
155 In South Africa, individual victim testimony was combined with, among 
other things, a more centralized investigative process that issued a report; the 
Rwandan genocide was addressed not only in the Gacaca courts but also in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and more formal domestic criminal 
trials.  See Rosemary Nagy, Traditional Justice and Legal Pluralism in Transitional 
Context: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, in RECONCILIATIONS: TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES 86, 87 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009) (“Through the 
face-to-face participation of all community members in gacaca, the government 
sought to establish truth, justice, and reconciliation on the basis of Rwandan 
custom.”). 
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resentments can minimize the “impunity gap” created by selective 
justice, thereby fostering reconciliation at the local level.  
5.2. Questioning the Value of Truth in Reconciliation 
Most controversially, the Athenian case casts doubt on an 
underlying assumption held by many who study transitional 
justice: the importance of establishing and recording the truth 
behind mass atrocities.156  The recent proliferation of truth and 
reconciliation commissions is indicative of a widespread belief that 
investigating and recording how atrocities came about is an 
essential component of reconciliation.157
And yet, accurately assigning responsibility for atrocities 
committed during the tyranny played no role in Athens’ 
spectacularly successful transition.  We have seen that the 
Athenian courts created a false collective memory of the war, 
which focused blame narrowly on the Thirty and denied the 
widespread collaboration and participation by ordinary Athenians 
in the violence.  This narrative appears to have promoted a sense of 
unity among the populace.  To be sure, the use of these fictions in 
court did not erase individual victims’ resentment against specific 
collaborators who had done them harm.  But the collective 
memory of the oligarchy constructed in the courts may have made 
victims more willing to trust men whose level of active 
collaboration was minimal or unknown to them.  For those who 
had remained in the city, the discourse in the courts offered a 
rationalization for past collaboration and provided comfort that 
there was a place for them in the restored democracy. 
 
The Athenian experience suggests that there may be some 
instances where a shared fiction might do more to foster unity and 
reconciliation than the truth.158
 
156 See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 2, at 69–118 (discussing the establishment of 
historical truth as a central function of transitional justice).  But see Erin Daly, 
Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition, 2 INT.’L J. 
OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 36–39 (2008) (providing a more skeptical account of the 
role of truth in reconciliation). 
  The myth of widespread popular 
157 See, e.g., Geoff Dancy et al., The Turn to Truth: Trends in Truth Commission 
Experimentation, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 45 (2010) (analyzing the proliferation and evolution 
of truth commissions throughout the world). 
158 I am not suggesting consciously attempting to create such a shared fiction, 
which poses all sorts of difficulties.  See OSIEL, supra note 91, at 240–92 (discussing 
the promises and pitfalls of consciously creating collective memory, including the 
creation of misleading accounts of history).  Rather, I am simply suggesting that 
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opposition in France to the Nazi occupation provides a similar 
example.159
The Athenian courts did not seek to hash out the truth; because 
there was no public prosecutor and no detailed understanding of 
what constituted collaboration, they did not stir up grievances 
unnecessarily.  But they also allowed the airing of any wrong, no 
matter how old or unconnected to the subject of the suit.  
Moreover, they were inscrutable in their adjudications—no one 
knew why the jurors decided as they did, and no rule was 
established.  Did the jury believe that an allegation of collaboration 
was untrue, or did it find that the allegation, even if true, was 
outweighed by other factors?  No one knew.  But clarity in the 
wake of civil war is not necessarily a virtue.  People told their story 
and got their verdict; they believed what they wanted to believe 
about what the verdict meant.  The system moved on to the next 
case, and slowly everyone got on with his or her lives. 
  Of course, there may be independent normative 
reasons to insist on uncovering the truth regarding prior atrocities.  
But the Athenian case suggests that at least in some situations 
pursuing a true account of who bears responsibility for atrocities 
may not be necessary, or even desirable, if the primary aim is to 
ensure an enduring, peaceful reconciliation. 
 
 
the widespread assumption that uncovering the truth is necessary to a successful 
transition may be incorrect. 
159 See id. at 101 (describing how the initial scope of the postwar criminal 
trials in France was limited to high-ranking officials and to those in other 
prominent positions, although in many cases the general population also 
participated in the atrocities). 
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